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A GROUP HOME EXCLUSIVELY FOR MARRIED COUPLES 
WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES: 





Q: Why do you want to get married? 
A: We love each other.  That‟s why.  I want to get married, 
and live with him, and I‟ll be there for him, and he‟ll be there 
for me . . . 
Q: What do you think it means to be married? 
A: To be in love and complete. 
Q: What do you think your life will be like after you are mar-
ried? 
A: I want to live on my own.  I want to move on, get my own 
life with [him, he is] my partner in life.  He‟ll be there for me, 
no matter what. 
Q: [Are you afraid of moving away from your home?] 
A: I‟m a twenty-six year old woman and I want to get married 
and move on. . . .  He want[s] to get married.  And the point is 
the he [has] fallen in love with me and not anyone else.  He 
wants me.  That‟s what he wants.  That‟s what I want.  We 
want to get married . . . as soon as possible.1 
 
* Juris Doctor Candidate, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, May 2012; B.A. 
Fairfield University.  I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my family and friends 
for their unconditional love and support throughout my educational career, with particular 
thanks to my loving parents.  Special thanks go to the talented members of the Touro Law 
Review for their advice, support, assistance, and friendship.  Lastly, I would like to dedicate 
this Comment to my cousin, Amanda, for providing me not only with the inspiration to write 
about this topic, but also for a lifetime of inspiration to live to my fullest potential, some-
thing I hope she will be able to do as a result of this Comment. 
1 Interview with Amanda Baldwin, in Yaphank, N.Y. (Oct. 3, 2010) (on file with author). 
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The responses above came from my cousin, Amanda Bald-
win, a woman with Down syndrome2 considered to have mild mental 
retardation.3  She and her boyfriend of three years are engaged and 
plan to marry.  He is also developmentally disabled4 and currently 
lives in a group home.5  The two plan to live a life that they consider 
“normal,” including a wedding, cohabitation, and a sexual relation-
ship.  Although Ms. Baldwin‟s responses show that she has a clear 
understanding of the emotional commitment of marriage and its 
meaning, she will face the possible dissolution of her upcoming mar-
riage due to her lack of capacity to give consent,6 and will have great 
difficulty finding an appropriate residence in which both she and her 
future husband can live as a married couple.7 
 
2 See generally Down syndrome, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE (Sept. 26, 2010), 
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/down-syndrome (“Down syndrome is a chromosomal con-
dition that is associated with intellectual disability . . . . The degree of intellectual disability 
varies, but it is usually mild to moderate.”). 
3 See GEORGE S. BAROFF & J. GREGORY OLLEY, MENTAL RETARDATION: NATURE, CAUSE, 
AND MANAGEMENT 8 (Brunner/Mazel, 3d ed. 1999) (identifying four characterizations of 
mental retardation: mild, moderate, severe, and profound).  While many degrees within men-
tal retardation are often described in terms of the range of abilities the person may have or 
the responsibilities he or she understands, the initial determination typically begins with In-
telligence Quotient (IQ) test performance.  Id. at 8.  Persons with mild mental retardation fall 
within an IQ range of 52-69, while those with moderate mental retardation fall within an IQ 
range of 36-54, those with severe mental retardation typically have an IQ range of 20-39, 
and those with profound mental retardation typically have an IQ range of 0-24.  Id. at 9. 
4 See id. at 247 (describing developmental disabilities as “disorders presented at birth or 
arising in childhood that are chronic in nature and require similar habilitative services . . . . 
[T]he term now encompasses all developmental disorders—sensory and physical as well as 
cognitive—that significantly affect major areas of daily living.”). 
5 Group homes, or community residential facilities, are homes in residential areas housing 
anywhere from four to fifteen unrelated individuals with similar disabilities (mental, physi-
cal, or addiction) staffed with people that provide supervision and services to the residents.  
Stephen F. Hayes, The “Usual Incidents of Citizenship”: Rethinking When People with Dis-
abilities Must Participate in Public Variance Proceedings, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 2044, 2047 
(2009); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 686.99(l) (2012) (defining a community res-
idence as “[a] facility providing housing, supplies and services for persons who are deve-
lopmentally disabled and who, in addition to these basic requirements, need supportive in-
terpersonal relationships, supervision, and training assistance in the activities of daily 
living.”). 
6 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 7(2) (McKinney 2011) (“A marriage is void if either party     
. . . [i]s incapable of consenting to a marriage for want of understanding.”). 
7 See Interview with Bonnie Guimela, Senior Ed. Specialist for The Cody Ctr. for Autism 
and Developmental Disabilities at Stony Brook Univ., in Stony Brook, N.Y. (Feb. 10, 2011) 
(on file with author).  Bonnie Guimela is a social worker with extensive experience working 
with the developmentally disabled.  She currently heads the Sexual Education and Relation-
2
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In an attempt to make their plans a reality, Ms. Baldwin and 
her boyfriend, along with two other interested couples with similar 
disabilities, seek to create a group home designed exclusively for 
married couples with developmental disabilities.  While this kind of 
group home may seem to some like a wonderful service, and even a 
fairly logical concept, such a group home does not yet exist, and find-
ing support for its creation has proven to be an incredibly daunting 
task.  While there are married couples with developmental disabilities 
that live in group homes with other unmarried individuals,8 there are 
no group homes in the United States designed specifically to provide 
a supportive environment exclusively for married couples. 
This Comment advocates for the development of this unique 
and unprecedented group home, establishing the basis for its creation 
by demonstrating that public policy supports providing this type of 
environment as a necessary service for the distinct group of individu-
als seeking it.  This Comment will discuss the history of how the law 
has treated those with mental disabilities and will demonstrate that 
with the vast progression in the treatment of, and the rights afforded 
to, individuals with developmental disabilities, a group home de-
signed specifically for married couples is a natural next-step in the 
expansion and personalization of the services provided to these indi-
viduals.  Additionally, because Ms. Baldwin and her boyfriend will 
marry and live in New York, this Comment will not only discuss 
general guidelines governing this unique situation, but will also pay 
particular attention to New York regulations. 
Section II will outline the progression of marital rights of the 
developmentally disabled in order to demonstrate the evolution of 
rights afforded to the developmentally disabled while also revealing 
one of the many hurdles the couple will face in attempting to have the 
“normal” life they so desperately seek.  Section III will identify the 
housing options available for married couples with developmental 
disabilities unable to live independently and the popularization of 
group homes.  Lastly, section IV will address, and subsequently dis-
 
ship Training Division of The Cody Center for Autism and Developmental Disabilities at 
Stony Brook University, and is currently working with couples seeking to get married and 
live together in a group home setting.  See generally The Cody Center For Autism and Deve-
lopmental Disabilities, STONY BROOK UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, 
http://www.stonybrookmedicalcenter.org/codycenter (last visited Feb. 2, 2011). 
8 Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7. 
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credit, the likely opposition to the construction of this type of residen-
tial facility. 
The analysis in this Comment will focus primarily on the 
rights of individuals with mental retardation and other developmental 
disabilities who are unable to live independently and require the ser-
vices of at-home care, institutions, or other residential facilities.  It 
will not discuss services for the mentally ill or individuals with cog-
nitive disabilities considered to be “high-functioning” or merely 
“mentally weak” because individuals in these classifications have ad-
ditional living options and tend to face fewer restrictions due to their 
heightened capacity to understand the consequences of their deci-
sions. 
II. MARITAL RIGHTS OF THE DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED 
As humans, we have social and biological desires to marry, 
live together, and create a family.  Unsurprisingly, individuals with 
developmental disabilities share these same ambitions.9  However, 
societal views have historically resisted the idea of the developmen-
tally disabled engaging in romantic relationships.10  While the treat-
ment of individuals with developmental disabilities has evolved ex-
tensively in the past few decades, with the trend toward 
deinstitutionalization11 and the recognition of their right against dis-
crimination,12 there is still significant room for growth, particularly in 
attempting to change society‟s views of this often stigmatized group. 
 
9 J. Dale Munro, Couple Therapy and Support: A Positive Model for People with Intellec-
tual Disabilities, NADD, http://www.thenadd.org/cgi-bin/checkmember.pl?page=pages/ 
membership/bulletins/v10n5a1 (last visited Jan. 22, 2012). 
10 Id. (attributing this resistance largely to fears of sexual relationships that will result in 
pregnancy). 
11 See Laura E. Hortas, Asylum Protection for the Mentally Disabled: How the Evolution 
of Rights for the Mentally Ill in the United States Created a “Social Group,” 20 CONN. J. 
INT‟L L. 155, 161-62 (2004) (discussing the trend moving away from the institutionalization 
of those with mental disabilities and toward community care, with the government adopting 
the position that moving the mentally ill to an institution “should only be used as a last 
resort”). 
12 See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (2006).  The Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act specifically mandates “the elimination of discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities” on a national level as a result of several findings warranting a 
need for such legislation.  Id. at § 12101(a), (b)(1). 
4
Touro Law Review, Vol. 28 [2012], No. 2, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss2/7
  
2012 A NATURAL NEXT-STEP 455 
 
A. Historical Background 
It is well known that the developmentally disabled have a 
substantial history of mistreatment and degradation in the codifica-
tion of American law.13  Thankfully, there has been a steady trend 
among Congress and state legislatures toward removing the stigma 
traditionally placed upon the developmentally disabled and “actively 
encourag[ing] the „normalization‟ of people with disabilities.”14  
However, this “reform movement has had little effect on the right of 
the people with mental retardation to marry.”15 
For much of American history, individuals with mental dis-
abilities were essentially uninhibited by state legislation regarding 
marriage and procreation.16  The same standard of determining 
whether a marriage would be upheld applied equally to both the men-
tally disabled population and the rest of society, with the only decid-
ing factor being whether the two individuals “were able to understand 
the basic concept of marriage.”17  However, by the beginning of the 
twentieth century, this outlook changed severely with the rise of the 
Eugenics movement.18  During this movement, eugenic ideals in-
spired laws restricting the right of developmentally disabled persons 
to marry based upon “a belief that social engineering through con-
trolled or selective reproduction could help purify the human race.”19  
In 1896, Connecticut enacted the first piece of legislation prohibiting 
the mentally disabled community from marrying, and by 1914, over 
twenty states had followed the trend.20  With an interest in “societal 
productivity,” states disallowed marriage of people with mental dis-
 
13 See id. at § 12101(a)(2)-(5) (finding that individuals with disabilities have had a long 
history of discrimination, both socially and politically, that persisted leading up to the 
enactment of this legislation, for which these individuals “often had no legal recourse to re-
dress such discrimination.”). 
14 Brooke Pietrzak, Marriage Laws and People with Mental Retardation: A Continuing 
History of Second Class Treatment, 17 DEV. IN MENTAL HEALTH LAW 1, 1-2 (1997). 
15 Id. at 2. 
16 See Matthew D. Martin III, The Dysfunctional Progeny of Eugenics: Autonomy Gone 
AWOL, 15 CARDOZO J. INT‟L & COMP. L. 371, 375 (2007). 
17 Id. 
18 Jonathan Matloff, Idiocy Lunacy, and Matrimony: Exploring Constitutional Challenges 
to State Restrictions on Marriages of Persons with Mental Disabilities, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER 
SOC, POL‟Y & L. 497, 501 (2009). 
19 Id. 
20 Hortas, supra note 11, at 159. 
5
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abilities and forced sterilization because of the belief that mental re-
tardation would be passed on to their children.21  Some courts also 
based their decisions on unreliable scientific data, stating that, “idio-
cy, insanity, imbecility, and criminality are congenital and heredita-
ry,”22 in order to promote the state‟s interest in protecting the public 
from “afflicted” offspring.23  In 1927, the United States Supreme 
Court showed its official support of this state interest by upholding 
the validity of a Virginia law that gave the superintendents of mental 
institutions the authority to sterilize patients in order to prevent the 
transmission of “imbecility” through procreation.24 
The Court‟s decision, among other things, marked a shift in 
American culture, after which much of society began to view people 
with mental disabilities as outcasts, forcing sterilization and creating 
mental institutions with the hidden agenda of further isolating this 
population from society and, in effect, from the opposite sex.25  This 
practice stigmatized the group and indoctrinated Americans with the 
belief that this group of people needed to be isolated, both from so-
ciety and from each other; a stigma that, in many ways, still perpe-
tuates today in the discouragement of marriage through legislation.26 
The end of World War II marked a call for reform that re-
sulted in substantial changes to the health care system for the mental-
ly disabled.27  However, the reform was focused primarily on improv-
ing the quality of care provided by institutions and was not reflected 
in marriage statutes.28 
 
21 Matloff, supra note 18, at 501-02. 
22 State v. Feilen, 126 P. 75, 76 (Wash. 1912) (upholding a sentence requiring a man 
found guilty of rape to be subjected to a vasectomy); see also Smith v. Command, 204 N.W. 
140, 142 (Mich. 1925) (citing to medical studies that show “a reasonable degree of certainty 
that feeble-mindedness is hereditary”). 
23 Matloff, supra note 18, at 501. 
24 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207-08 (1927) (referring to “imbeciles” as a class of people 
that “sap the strength of the State,” and remarking that “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are 
enough”). 
25 See Martin, supra note 16, at 375; Matloff, supra note 18, at 500. 
26 See discussion infra Part II.B (discussing many current marriage laws that severely re-
strict and even prohibit marriage of a person with mental disabilities). 
27 Hortas, supra note 11, at 161. 
28 See id.; Pietrzak, supra note 14, at 2. 
6
Touro Law Review, Vol. 28 [2012], No. 2, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss2/7
  
2012 A NATURAL NEXT-STEP 457 
 
 
B. The Current Status of Marriage Laws and New 
York’s Voidable Marriage 
Unfortunately, some statutes still harbor the language of the 
eugenics-era in their text.29  Using words such as “imbecile,” “idiot,” 
“feeble-minded,” “lunatic,” or “mental deficients” to classify all de-
grees of mental incapacity, states have lumped all those with mental 
disabilities into one group in which all “person[s] of any degree of 
unsoundness of mind” would be restricted in their ability to marry, 
further allowing the eugenic-era perspective that people with mental 
disabilities are sub-human or in some way defective to be perpetuated 
even in modern society.30  Most states have attempted to deviate from 
this outlook by amending the terms used within the statutory text, but 
there has been little substantive change in the law.31 
At common law, and under codification in certain jurisdic-
tions, the marriage of a person of “unsound mind,” who would there-
fore be deemed incapable of understanding the nature, duties, and 
consequences of a marriage, is absolutely void.32  When a marriage is 
said to be completely void, it may never be validated.33  In essence, 
because no marital rights are secured and the couple would be able to 
act as if the marriage never occurred, issues such as the legitimacy of 
children and property disputes have proven to be cumbersome and 
unjust.34  However, in most United States jurisdictions, a marriage 
involving at least one party with a mental disability is not void, but 
rather voidable, and will remain valid until either party contests the 
marriage contract or seeks an annulment.35 
 
29 See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1304(c) (West 2010) (prohibiting a marriage li-
cense to be issued to an individual that is “weak minded, insane, [or] of unsound mind”); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-109 (West 2010) (indicating that a marriage license cannot be is-
sued to someone that “appears . . . at the time drunk, insane, or an imbecile”); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 15, §512 (West 2010) (declaring that a marriage contract may be annulled when 
either party was “an idiot or lunatic” at the time of the marriage); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-3-
103(a)(3)(A) (West 2010) (stating that marriages are voidable, and void when declared by 
the court to be so, when either party “was an insane person, idiot, or imbecile”). 
30 Pietrzak, supra note 14, at 2-3. 
31 Id. at 3, 33. 
32 Id. at 33. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 See Pietrzak, supra note 14, at 33. 
7
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In New York, a marriage is void from its nullity, and there-
fore voidable, when either party “[i]s incapable of consenting to a 
marriage for want of understanding.”36  The statute does not attempt 
to define “want of understanding,” nor does it clearly separate the 
mentally ill from the developmentally disabled in its general rule.  
However, the two groups are treated substantially differently when 
one party seeks an annulment of his or her voidable marriage,37 signi-
fying the need for more specificity in the voidable marriage statute.  
The broad language dangerously forces a spectrum of disabilities, and 
abilities, to fall within the statute. 
Significantly, the statute does not require an initial showing of 
capacity before a couple with developmental disabilities obtains a 
marriage license or has a wedding.  Instead, it merely provides reme-
dies for the party seeking to annul or void a marriage due to lack of 
capacity,38 resulting in case law that only explains how to get out of 
marriage as opposed to how to enter into one.39  This has left many 
people with disabilities clueless about the process of getting married 
and has allowed private agencies caring for these individuals to con-
trol the process by requiring each person seeking marriage to pass a 
test “proving” that he or she has the capacity to consent to a marriage 
and to engage in a sexual relationship.40 
C. The Capacity Requirement 
The “unsound mind” and “want of understanding” standards 
imply a requirement of a certain mental capacity in order for the mar-
riage to be valid.  A problem arises, however, as a result of the va-
 
36 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 7(2). 
37 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 140(c).  In an action to annul a marriage on the grounds that 
a party to the action was mentally retarded at the time of the marriage, the only guideline 
enumerated in the New York Domestic Relations Law is that any relative of the mentally 
retarded party with an interest in avoiding the marriage may bring the annulment at any time 
during the lifetime of either party.  Id.  However, there are several specific guidelines, dis-
tinguishable from the solitary instruction given for mental retardation, listed regarding an 
annulment involving a party that is mentally ill.  See id. 
38 Id. 
39 See, e.g., Levine v. Dumbra, 604 N.Y.S.2d 207, 208 (App. Div. 1993) (providing only 
guidelines for showing incompetence rather than competence). 
40 See Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7; discussion infra Part II.C.ii (focusing 
on the consent testing requirement and providing examples of tests used in New York). 
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gueness of these standards because they encompass a significantly 
broad spectrum of mental disability.  While courts have recognized 
the lack of a precise definition of “unsound mind,” they have further 
insisted upon the difficulty, and have been reluctant to develop a 
comprehensive definition.41  However, in an attempt to narrow a sta-
tute‟s constraint on an overly broad group of people, some courts 
have specifically stated that mere mental weakness or low intellect is 
insufficient to fall within these statutes.42  Most significantly, many 
jurisdictions have declared that the individual must have the specific 
inability to understand the special nature of the contract of marriage, 
and the duties that accompany such a contract, at the time of the mar-
riage in order for the marriage to be void or voidable.43  As one court 
described, “[o]rdinarily, lack of mental capacity, which renders a par-
ty incapable of entering into a valid marriage contract, must be such 
that it deprives him [or her] of the ability to understand the objects of 
marriage, its ensuing duties and undertakings, its responsibilities and 
relationship.”44  Likewise, an individual may have the specific ca-
pacity to understand the special nature of the contract of marriage 
while potentially lacking a similar capacity to enter into other con-
tracts, and vice versa.45 
Typically, mental capacity must relate specifically to the con-
tract of marriage, not necessarily the capacity to contract generally.46  
Courts often make the distinction between the two levels of capacity, 
many finding that the capacity to enter into a marriage contract is 
lower than that required for a business transaction.47  However, this 
seems like an unnecessary distinction because the Law of Contracts 
 
41 See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 104 N.W.2d 8, 13-14 (N.D. 1960). 
42 See, e.g., Ertel v. Ertel, 40 N.E.2d 85, 89 (Ill. App. Ct. 1942). 
43 See Johnson, 104 N.W.2d at 14. 
44 Id. 
45 See id. at 17 (stating that different tests apply for determinations of capacity for guar-
dianship purposes and for marriage, resulting in the ability of a person found to be incompe-
tent under a guardianship standard to potentially have sufficient mental capacity to enter into 
a valid marriage contract). 
46 See Edmunds v. Edwards, 287 N.W.2d 420, 422 (Neb. 1980) (denying the plaintiff, a 
man found by the Court to be “mentally retarded,” the ability to annul his marriage because, 
at the time of its inception, the degree of his mental incapacity was not of the nature that 
rendered him incompetent to enter into a marriage due to the fact that he had adequate capac-
ity to understand the marriage contract and the duties that follow). 
47 See, e.g., Ertel, 40 N.E.2d at 89 (stating that Illinois requires less capacity for a mar-
riage contract than for executing an ordinary business contract). 
9
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focuses on an understanding of the specific transaction and whether 
the “transaction in its result is one which a reasonably competent per-
son might have made.”48 
The ways in which courts classified the differences between 
marriage and business contracts became more creative over time.  For 
example, one court relied upon emotional factors rather than mental 
abilities, stating that, “marriage depends to a great extent on senti-
ment, attachment, and affection which persons with equal, as well as 
those with stronger intellects feel and . . . it does not depend, to the 
extent that ordinary contracts do, on the exercise of clear reason, dis-
cernment, and sound judgment.”49  Another court went even further 
as to say that while marriage is referred to as a civil contract under 
the law, it is actually nothing of the sort.50  Rather, “[w]hat persons 
establish by entering into matrimony, is not a contractual relation, but 
a social Status; and the only essential features of the transactions are 
that the participants are of legal capacity to assume that Status, and 
freely consent so to do.”51 
 1. Measuring Capacity 
Whether explaining mental incapacity by analogizing it to the 
links of a chain,52 or simply ignoring degrees of developmental disa-
bility, state courts have consistently struggled to create specific 
guidelines in order to determine whether a party is incompetent and 
the degree to which the individual‟s disability contributes to this lack 
of understanding.53  In an attempt to create a standard for entering in-
to a marriage, Maine adopted legislation stating that, “[a] person who 
is impaired by reason of mental illness or mental retardation to the 
extent that he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make, 
communicate or implement responsible decisions concerning that 
 
48 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 cmt. b (1979). 
49 Griffin v. Beddow, 268 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Ky. Ct. of App. 1954). 
50 Edmunds, 287 N.W.2d at 425. 
51 Id. (quoting Univ. of Mich. v. McGukin, 89 N.W.2d 778, 779 (Neb. 1902)). 
52 Rawdon v. Rawdon, 28 Ala. 565, 567 (1856) (attempting to explain degrees of “un-
soundness” by stating, “[t]he faculties of a sound mind are links, composing a chain.  These 
links may be worn and weakened, and still the chain exists.  Break or destroy one of them, 
and the unity and continuity are gone.”). 
53 Matloff, supra note 18, at 504. 
10
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person‟s property or person is not capable of contracting marriage”54  
However, this language completely ignores an individual‟s specific 
ability to appreciate the marriage contract and marital relationship, 
and creates a standard that rests solely on general disabilities, remi-
niscent of those requirements necessary for the appointment of a 
guardian.55 
California made an attempt to provide statutory guidance by 
developing a list of factors for analyzing an individual‟s capacity to 
perform certain acts.56  The list includes the ability to concentrate, 
understand, communicate, reason, and recognize objects and 
people.57  This statute, however, is not specific to marriage, and in-
stead applies to a broad list of contractual abilities, including the ca-
pacity to contract, execute a will, and make medical decisions.58  
While this is a step in a positive direction, general skills such as the 
ability to communicate cannot effectively measure an individual‟s 
specific capacity to enter into a marriage contract as required by the 
courts. 
Each state legislature has therefore relied upon case law to 
further define the meaning of statutory text.  However, many courts, 
including the United States Supreme Court, refuse to make such in-
terpretations.59  In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,60 the 
Court stated that legislation affecting “this large and diversified 
group” of mentally disabled persons “is a difficult and often a tech-
nical matter, very much a task for legislators guided by qualified pro-
fessionals and not by the perhaps ill-informed opinions of the judi-
ciary.”61 
Despite this seesawing between the courts and the legislature, 
 
54 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 701(3) (West 2011).  The statute also includes a defi-
nition of both mental illness and mental retardation, specifically making them separate.  Id. 
at § 701(3)(A)-(B). 
55 Generally, statutes guiding the guardianship appointment for a disabled person require 
the individual to lack appreciation and understanding of his or her disability such that it lim-
its his or her ability to care for his or her person or property.  See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. 
LAW § 81.15(b)(1)-(2), (c)(2)-(3) (McKinney 2011). 
56 CAL. PROB. CODE § 811(a)(1)-(3) (West 2011). 
57 Id. at § 811(a)(1)(C), (2)(B)-(E). 
58 Id. at § 811(a). 
59 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442-43 (1985). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 442-43. 
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a general standard requiring the individual to understand the nature 
and consequences of marriage, and comprehend the significance of 
being married, at the time the marriage contract was made has 
emerged among jurisdictions.62  The conflict here is that case law in 
this area focuses on presenting evidence that the individual was in-
competent in order to void or annul a marriage rather than presenting 
guidelines and standards necessary to demonstrate the proper capaci-
ty to contract.63 
In practice, particularly among agencies charged with the care 
of individuals with mental disabilities, those seeking to marry must 
first be tested on their capacity to consent to marriage.64  However, in 
actuality, this test does not measure the specific capacity to consent to 
the contract of marriage, but instead evaluates the individual‟s ca-
pacity to consent to a sexual relationship.65  Unfortunately, many of 
the standards used to measure sexual capacity that are acknowledged 
in New York come from rape cases in which one of the parties had a 
mental defect that rendered him or her incapable of giving consent.66  
As a result, much of the focus in this evaluation rests upon the volun-
tary aspect of the individual‟s behavior.67  New York has also identi-
fied a “morality standard,” under which “a person must be mentally 
capable of understanding the social mores of sexual behavior . . . 
[and] the non-criminal penalties (e.g., ostracism, stigmatization) that 
society may impose for conduct it labels as sexually immoral . . . 
[such as] sexually exploitive behavior.”68  In practice, this translates 
 
62 Johnson, 104 N.W.2d at 14.  It is also well accepted among jurisdictions that this in-
formation must be ascertained by the facts on a case-by-case basis.  Id.  One court stated 
that, “[i]t is difficult to lay down any general comprehensive test for determining the degree 
of mental capacity required to contract a marriage.  Each case must of necessity be decided 
on its own facts.”  De la Montanya v. De la Montanya, 281 P. 825, 825 (Or. 1929). 
63 Levine, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 208 (providing only guidelines for showing incompetence ra-
ther than competence). 
64 See Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7. 
65 Id. 
66 See, e.g., People v. Easley, 364 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1977) (discussing how the victim 
was unable to consent to sexual activity due to mental incapacity); People v. Cratsley, 653 
N.E.2d 1162 (N.Y. 1995) (dealing with the rape of a 33-year-old woman who was incapable 
of consenting to sexually activity). 
67 BAROFF & OLLEY, supra note 3, at 251 (stating that consent may be obtained verbally 
and behaviorally as long as there is a clear indication that the sexual activity is voluntary). 
68 Martin Lyden, Assessment of Sexual Consent Capacity, 25 SEXUALITY AND DISABILITY 
3, 5 (2007).  Additionally, this article mentions that some other states do not require this 
12
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to the individual knowing and understanding the difference between 
appropriate public and private behavior.69  The New York Court of 
Appeals emphasized that: 
An understanding of coitus encompasses more than a 
knowledge of its physiological nature.  An apprecia-
tion of how it will be regarded in the framework of the 
societal environment and taboos to which a person 
will be exposed may be far more important.  In that 
sense, the moral quality of the act is not to be ig-
nored.70 
In a later case, the same court asserted that proof of incapacity could 
not be evidenced by the individual‟s disability alone, as the law does 
not presume that an individual with disabilities is unable to consent to 
sex.71  This instruction has led to reliance on consent testing that ex-
amines other traits and indicators of an individual‟s ability to under-
stand the nature of a sexual relationship.72 
 2. Testing Capacity 
Although the New York statute governing marriage does not 
require proof of capacity before obtaining a marriage license,73 non-
governmental agencies that serve as legal guardians for the mentally 
disabled require that these individuals pass consent tests demonstrat-
ing the individual‟s ability to give consent to a sexual relationship.74  
Despite the lack of a requirement to prove capacity to marry by the 
 
added understanding of the morality of the sexual act, and instead only demand an under-
standing of the nature of sexual behavior and its potential consequences.  Id. at 6. 
69 See Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 59 (discussing the need for individuals 
to know the difference between private and public acts); Interview with Amanda Baldwin, 
supra note 1 (demonstrating her understanding of public and private conduct: “Un-private is 
like, public, like we‟re going out somewhere and we can‟t do that when we‟re going out . . . 
in private you can do anything you want in our room, just me and him together, not me and 
the staff . . . [b]ut me and him are husband and wife and that‟s different.  That‟s private 
stuff.”). 
70 Easley, 364 N.E.2d at 1332 (internal citations omitted). 
71 Cratsley, 653 N.E.2d at 1165. 
72 See Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7. 
73 See N.Y. DOM. REL. Law § 10; N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 13 (requiring only a marriage 
license before the solemnization of the marriage). 
74 See Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7. 
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state legislature, private agencies feel entitled to compel these indi-
viduals to satisfactorily pass a consent test according to their profes-
sional judgment by manipulating the consent requirement of the New 
York Penal Law75 to give them such a power.76  Because an individu-
al may lack consent under the statute because of an incapacity result-
ing from a mental disability,77 agencies‟ fear of liability and the po-
tential for criminal charges has led the agencies to resort to consent 
testing, often using tests drafted by the individual agency or those 
given by the New York State Office for People with Developmental 
Disabilities (“OPWDD”),78 in order for the couple to gain permission 
from the agency to marry.79 
To say that there is no clear test for evaluating the capacity to 
consent to a sexual relationship is an understatement, making these 
testing requirements quite problematic.  Not only do the criteria for 
measuring capacity to consent to sexual activity vary across jurisdic-
tions, but they also vary within jurisdictions.80  In fact, some states 
have no significant guidelines whatsoever.81  This means that not on-
ly can an individual be deemed to have capacity in one state and not 
in another, but he or she can also be deemed to have capacity by one 
agency and not by another within the same state, or even within the 
same county.82  Additionally, of the tests that do exist, all are com-
 
75 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(1) (McKinney 2011) (requiring consent to engage in sexual 
activity). 
76 See Lyden, supra note 68, at 4. 
77 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(2)(b), (3)(b). 
78 See NYS OFFICE FOR PEOPLE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, 
http://www.omr.state.ny.us (last modified Nov. 10, 2010).  The OPWDD only recently re-
ceived this name in July, 2010.  Governor Paterson Signs Historic Name Change Into Law, 
NYS OFFICE FOR PEOPLE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, (last modified Nov. 17, 2010) 
http://omr.state.ny.us/news/name_change.jsp.  Note that because this name change is new, 
New York statutes conferring authority upon this office to monitor residences and develop 
rules and regulations governing services for the developmentally disabled may still use its 
previous name, the Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities 
(“OMRDD”). 
79 See Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7. 
80 Lyden, supra note 68, at 5. 
81 See Carrie H. Kennedy, Legal and Psychological Implications in the Assessment of 
Sexual Consent in the Cognitively Impaired Population, 10 ASSESSMENT 352, 353 (2003), 
available at http://asm.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/10/4/352 (stating that some states 
lack any precedent on record). 
82 See id. at 353; Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7 (stating that examiners can 
be swayed by the agency he or she works for, often making their opinion outcome determin-
14
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pletely subjective and lack any form of standardization.83  This lack 
of objectivity can easily lead to grave consequences with the unde-
served denial of an individual‟s right to engage in a sexual relation-
ship.84 
Although there is no consistent standard, some evaluators are 
directed to examine and establish five principles of consent before 
deeming an individual capable of consenting: 
[1] Awareness of the nature of sexual acts and the 
ability to choose to engage or abstain; [2] understand-
ing of how you prevent unwanted pregnancies and 
STI‟s; [3] understanding of the need to restrict sexual 
behavior to certain times and places; [4] understanding 
that certain sexual behaviors are illegal in this state; 
and [5] the ability to identify harmful situations and to 
avoid being exploited and harmed.85 
The general purpose of evaluating these five principles is to allow the 
individual to demonstrate an understanding of the conduct in which 
he or she seeks to engage, and that he or she comprehends and will 
accept responsibility for the consequences that may result from the 
sexual conduct.86 
A consent assessment generally employs one or more of three 
information gathering methods: 1) a review of medical records; 2) as-
sessments made by people who know and have worked with the indi-
vidual, usually including staff members at an agency with which he 
or she is closely associated; and/or 3) interviews with a person able to 
evaluate the individual‟s mental status, perceivable knowledge, and 
 
ative because many agencies do not like to allow individuals to pass the test). 
83 Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7 (“Q: So the test is not standardized?  A: 
It‟s not even objective.”). 
84 Kennedy, supra note 81, at 353; see generally Lyden, supra note 68, at 3-4 (“There is a 
presumption in American law that an individual has the prerequisite capacity to engage in a 
sexual relationship once he/she reaches the age of consent.  An adult is entitled to all of his 
or her rights and privileges under the law, unless limitations are imposed by a court of      
law . . . .”). 
85 Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7.  In the interview, Ms. Guimela further 
discussed a couple that she is currently working with and their failure of the consent test de-
spite adequate knowledge: “Now, I will tell you that the two people that I saw, I could sit 
down and talk to them and they could answer all of those things appropriately, and yet their 
individual agencies said that they did not pass their consent test.”  Id. 
86 Id. 
15
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understanding of consequences.87  However, the most likely assessor 
is a representative of the agency providing services to the individual, 
or the agency to which the individual has the closest personal connec-
tion.88 
Some consent assessments use pictures, videos, and examples 
to evaluate an individual‟s level of understanding.89  One test utilized 
in New York examines whether the individual understands the physi-
cal aspects of sex and sexual organs as well as the different levels of 
intimacy, pregnancy, birth control, and sexually transmitted diseas-
es.90  However, many tests also include observations gathered by a 
team of people that are closely associated with the disabled individu-
al, such as counselors and staff of his or her school or day program, 
in order to create an assessment based upon the observer‟s personal 
knowledge of the disabled individual‟s understanding of a sexual re-
lationship.91 
Agencies that are governed by OPWDD regulations have the 
responsibility to both protect those receiving its services while also 
encouraging their sexual rights.92  Often, these two notions live in 
conflict with one another.  Although staff and examiners have a duty 
to affirm individual sexual rights and are “tasked with promoting pa-
tient rights to include sexual rights,”93 in practice, very few patients 
pass the consent test.94  Unfortunately, a common outcome is the im-
proper determination of incapacity.95  This may be the result of im-
proper training, or the notion that facility representatives charged 
with giving the assessment worry more about the potential liability 
 
87 Lyden, supra note 68, at 10. 
88 See Kennedy, supra note 81, at 353. 
89 See, e.g., Dorothy Griffiths, Ph.D. & Yona Lunsky, Ph.D., Socio-Sexual Knowledge 
and Attitudes Assessment Tool-Revised (on file with author) [hereinafter Griffiths Consent 
Test]; see also Kennedy, supra note 81, at 354, Table 2 (identifying that the test used for the 
study in the paper used pictures and anatomically correct dolls). 
90 Griffiths Consent Test, supra note 89, at 2-3, 5-9. 
91 See Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7. 
92 Lyden, supra note 68, at 17. 
93 Kennedy, supra note 81, at 353; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14 § 633.4(a)(3) 
(2011) (“It is the responsibility of the agency/facility or sponsoring agency to ensure that 
rights [of sexuality] are not arbitrarily denied.”). 
94 Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7 (indicating that many agencies purpose-
fully make it very difficult to pass the assessments). 
95 See Lyden, supra note 68, at 9. 
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upon the agency than a true evaluation of capacity.96  Often, “the 
rights of people with intellectual disabilities have been abridged [by 
agencies] under the guise of protecting [other] individuals” within 
their care.97  Once an individual is deemed capable to engage in sex-
ual conduct, the responsibility lies with the agency charged with his 
or her supervision should any problems, such as deviant sexual beha-
vior, arise.98  Agencies tend to weigh these competing interests by 
showing preference for protection of others over the empowerment of 
sexual rights.99 
With many people being unable to pass the consent tests, it 
seems as though there is a hidden agenda within this testing process.  
The lack of standardization and objectivity allows for significant de-
ference to be given to the assessor and permits agencies to develop 
tests that are too difficult to pass.  By finding each individual unable 
to consent, the agency can avoid extra staff training to assist those in 
sexual relationships and a group home may then deny making any 
modifications to their residences to accommodate the couple.100  With 
the high risk of error in the potential hindrance of an individual‟s 
sexual rights, there is a clear need for reform in this practice.  Most 
critics suggest standardization of the tests, or at least the creation of 
an objective standard on which to evaluate these cases.101  Much of 
the issues that arise with the subjective assessor can be avoided by 
requiring that the assessor be an objective third party, working inde-
pendently of a private agency, to conduct the tests.  However, while 
some argue that consent testing is an absolute necessity,102 consent 
test procedures imposed by agencies should be abolished completely 
because of the undue burden placed upon the right to marry.  Only 
when a state legislature decides that consent testing should be a pre-
requisite to obtaining a marriage license does this practice seem ethi-
 
96 Kennedy, supra note 81, at 353 (“Unfortunately, there is usually no assessment com-
pleted, and decisions are made by nonprofessionals, such as direct care workers, and tend to 
be polarized (i.e., either ignore the activity or completely restrict all intimate activity).”); In-
terview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7. 
97 Lyden, supra note 68, at 17. 
98 See Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7. 
99 See Lyden, supra note 68, at 17. 
100 Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7. 
101 See, e.g., Lyden, supra note 68, at 16 (suggesting a standard that would be appropriate 
across jurisdictions). 
102 Id. at 9. 
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cal. 
One glaring problem with the practice of consent testing is the 
unfair burden placed on individuals seeking to engage in activities for 
which they have affirmative rights, including the fundamental right to 
marry103 and the right of individuals with developmental disabilities 
to have a sexual relationship.104  Agencies are requiring disabled in-
dividuals to demonstrate that they have the capacity to engage in such 
an activity while no such process exists for non-disabled individuals.  
As one social worker involved in the field of sexual education and 
consent testing elaborates: 
The law does not require you to prove that you can 
iron, and wash clothes, and cook dinners, and balance 
a budget, and wash the floor before you can get mar-
ried.  You don‟t have to prove that you‟re competent 
in any of those areas, and yet that‟s what we‟re telling 
them.  So we‟re not treating them like everyone else.  
We‟re singling them out and we‟re denying them their 
rights based on criteria that have nothing to do with 
marriage.105 
However, in the likelihood that the consent testing practice 
will continue, there is an increased need for sexual education among 
the mentally disabled, particularly for those seeking to engage in sex-
ual relationships.  While this may seem like a taboo and uncomforta-
ble topic for many, sexual activity among the disabled is unavoida-
ble.106  Interestingly, “those about whom society has the greatest 
ambivalence with respect to sex education have the greatest need for 
it.”107  Because an individual‟s lack of knowledge and understanding 
can lead to being deemed incapable, “[i]t is reasonable to presume 
that the persons whose sexual consent capacity is in question have an 
implied right to access services to assess their capacity and support 
 
103 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that the right to marry is a fun-
damental constitutionally protected right that may not be inhibited without a rational basis 
for a legitimate state interest). 
104 See tit. 14 § 633.4(a)(4)(xi)(a) (stating that no person receiving services from the state 
“shall be denied . . . [the] freedom to express sexuality”). 
105 Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7. 
106 See Munro, supra note 9. 
107 BAROFF & OLLEY, supra note 3, at 290. 
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them in achieving capacity if identified deficiencies can be ameli-
orated.”108  It is clear, and even expected, that the empowerment of 
sexual rights should be fully supported by providing adequate servic-
es.  Such sexual education services would be necessary on a regular 
basis for the occupants living in the group home proposed by this 
Comment. 
III. LIVING OPTIONS FOR MARRIED COUPLES WITH 
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES IN NEW YORK 
The right to live with one‟s spouse in one‟s preferred envi-
ronment should naturally be included with the right to marry.  Mar-
ried couples with developmental disabilities may live together, but 
their options for residences in which they can cohabitate while also 
receiving the services they each require is lacking, to say the least. 
Several options are available for unmarried individuals with 
developmental disabilities who are unable to live independently and 
require some sort of continuing home care.  These options can in-
clude: living with a family member, in a state-operated institution, in 
a supportive residential facility (also known as a supportive apart-
ment),109 or in a group home.  This list, however, shrinks significantly 
when a married couple, requiring continuous care, seeks a residence 
in which they can cohabitate as a married couple.  For this group, 
choice of residence is essentially limited to two options: living with a 
family member or living in a group home, assuming that the pair can 
find a group home that has available space and will allow them to 
live there.  However, because the majority of group homes are oper-
ated by independent organizations, most will not welcome a married 
couple.110 
 
108 Lyden, supra note 68, at 9. 
109 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14 § 686.99(l)(2)(ii) (2011) (defining “suppor-
tive community residence” as “a facility providing independent living under variable 
amounts of oversight delivered in accordance with the person‟s needs for such supervision”).  
Supportive community residences, however, do not apply to the groups within the scope of 
this Comment, as these groups require a “supervised community residence” with a staff that 
typically lives within the facility and is “available at all times when the persons are present.”  
See id. at (l)(2)(i). 
110 Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7. 
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A. Option One: Living with a Family Member 
In the care for children and adults with mental disabilities, 
there is an emphasis on rearing the child in the family home and de-
laying out-of-home placement.111  “Although out-of-home placement 
is virtually inevitable for all dependent [mentally disabled] adults,”112 
many choose to remain in the family home as long as possible and 
continue to live with their parents after leaving the public school sys-
tem, typically at the age of twenty-one.113  While the parents of dis-
abled children are given cash subsidies to aid with finances, provid-
ing adequate care for a person with developmental disabilities can be 
significantly burdensome on a family member in many ways; finan-
cially, emotionally, and in some cases, physically.114  This is particu-
larly true for elderly parents of adult children with severe mental 
and/or physical disabilities.115  As the life expectancy of those with 
mental disabilities continues to rise, so too does the responsibility 
placed on the aging parent.116  Parents of children with mental dis-
abilities are often referred to as “perpetual parents” because their pa-
rental responsibilities never seem to diminish, unlike how those of 
parents with non-disabled children naturally do.117  Many disabled 
adults will permanently require assistance with basic life skills such 
as bathing, dressing, and cooking, placing a significant burden on 
parents and family members, and particularly on those parents who 
do not receive family support services.118 
Parents of disabled children experience the same worries as 
 
111 BAROFF & OLLEY, supra note 3, at 300. 
112 Id. 
113 Janet Elder, Retarded Adults Test Autonomy, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1986, at C1. 
114 Disabilities - Impact of Disabilities on Families, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://family.Jrank.org/pages/396/Disabilities-Impact-Disabilities-on-
Families.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2012). 
115 See Nancy P. Kropf & Timothy B. Kelly, Stigmatized and Perpetual Parents: Older 
Parents Caring for Adult Children with Life-Long Disabilities, 24(1/2) J. OF 
GERONTOLOGICAL SOC. WORK 3, 3-4 (Jan. 1, 1995), available at 
http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=ssw_facpub. 
116 Id. at 4. 
117 Id. at 5. 
118 See id.; BAROFF & OLLEY, supra note 3, at 300.  Some family support services include 
respite care (temporary care, either within or outside of the family home, giving families the 
opportunity to take a break from the stresses of continuous care), parent counseling, parent 
training, and case management.  Id. 
20
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all parents.119  Nevertheless, these stressors are heightened when car-
ing for a disabled child—because of his or her innate vulnerability—
and are indefinitely prolonged.120  “Such fears can be crippling to 
both parents and children.”121  However, when living with parents, 
mentally disabled individuals have a high potential for being denied 
the important developmental services provided by a community resi-
dential facility.122  A dangerous result can be a lack of stimulation ne-
cessary for the growth and development of the mentally disabled 
adult: “Some mentally retarded people have not been stimulated in 
the right ways [when living with parents], and appear to be less capa-
ble than they really are.”123  The absence of services, such as those 
provided by a group home, can be detrimental to the development of 
an individual‟s vocational and life skills.124  Some say that life at 
home with a family member has the potential to be equally as restric-
tive as life in an institutional setting, resulting, in essence, in these 
individuals becoming a prisoner in their own homes.125  While this 
may be extreme, the possible impact of these restrictions is heigh-
tened when a parent must care for a married couple that should be re-
ceiving individualized services specific to meet their needs.126 
If a couple with developmental disabilities decides to marry 
and a group home is an unlikely option for them, they will likely be 
forced to reside with a parent or family member—assuming that the 
parent is willing to take on the responsibility of caring for yet another 
disabled person.  This action effectively causes every fear, anxiety, 
and stressor innate in caring for a person with mental disabilities to 
 
119 Elder, supra note 113 (including such stressors as, “fear of financial exploitation, sex-
ual involvement, even simply not eating balanced meals”). 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Mark C. Weber, Home and Community-Based Services, Olmstead, and Positive 
Rights: A Preliminary Discussion, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 269, 278 (2004). 
123 Elder, supra note 113 (quoting Jim Young, whom, at the time of the interview, was the 
deputy executive director of the President‟s Commission for Mental Retardation); see also 
Weber, supra note 122, at 278 (“Often, parents or other caregivers are elderly and cannot 
provide life-enriching activities including access to recreation, habilitation training, and em-
ployment.”). 
124 Weber, supra note 122, at 278. 
125 Id. 
126 See discussion infra Part III.B.ii.c (discussing the public policy of providing services to 
meet individual needs in order to allow a disabled individual to function at his or her highest 
level). 
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be doubled.  An attempt to then take on the responsibility of caring 
for yet another individual with a mental disability can seem like an 
incredibly overwhelming task.127  Because of this, a much healthier 
and viable option would be for a married couple to live in a group 
home. 
B. Option Two: Group Homes 
The lack of parental willingness to take on the responsibility 
of caring for two disabled adults naturally creates a significant re-
liance upon community residential facilities, commonly known as 
group homes.  These homes are facilities that provide “housing, sup-
plies and services for persons who are developmentally disabled and 
who, in addition to these basic requirements, need supportive inter-
personal relationships, supervision, and training assistance in the ac-
tivities of daily living.”128  Typically, these homes are located in resi-
dential areas and house a maximum of fourteen occupants.129  Group 
homes of this kind, mostly classified as “supervised community resi-
dence[s],” are fully staffed around the clock to assist residents with 
all of their daily functional needs.130  These needs typically include 
preparing meals, bathing, bringing residents to doctor visits, shop-
ping, and recreational activities.  Most importantly, group homes seek 
to “provide a home environment” and have a policy of encouraging 
residents “to live as independently as possible.”131 
 1. The History of Group Homes 
For a large part of America‟s history, the mentally disabled 
and mentally ill populations were segregated from society and institu-
tionalized because of a belief that they should remain isolated due to 
their inadequate contribution to society.132  It was not until the 1950‟s 
 
127 But cf. MONICA AND DAVID (CineMia 2010).  This documentary followed the lives of a 
two individuals with Down syndrome in their journey of beginning a life together.  Id.  The 
pair married and David, the new husband, moved in with his new wife‟s parents.  Id.  Her 
parents accepted David and provided adequate care for him without hesitation.  Id. 
128 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 686.99(l) (2011). 
129 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 686.3(a)(5)(i) (2011). 
130 Id. at § 686.99(l)(2)(i). 
131 Id. at § 686.99(l)(1)-(2). 
132 See Richard Rapson, The Right of the Mentally Ill to Receive Treatment in the Com-
22
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that there was a call for reform and an attempt to eliminate the stigma 
attached to the mentally disabled community.133  Prompted by ex-
posés revealing the appalling conditions, overcrowding, and neglect 
of patients by American mental hospitals, the deinstitutionalization 
movement called for the removal of patients from state mental insti-
tutions with preference for placement in less-restrictive environ-
ments.134  The healthcare system for the mentally disabled underwent 
major changes, with reformers specifically seeking to develop new 
alternatives to mental hospitals and institutions, including community 
care.135 
Out of this movement grew a focus on community-based care 
as a desirable alternative to institutional treatment.136  In the 1960‟s, 
the government took the position that the confinement of the mentally 
disabled in institutions should be a last resort.137  In 1963, President 
John F. Kennedy “proposed a bold new program for establishing 
community based treatment facilities,” resulting in the Mental Retar-
dation Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers Construction 
Act.138  Though the Act has since been repealed, it represented a sig-
nificant step away from institutionalization, as it was the first official 
sign of federal commitment to creating community residence alterna-
tives.139 
Another significant act of Congress was the enactment of the 
Home and Community-Based Services (“HCBS”) Waiver Pro-
gram,140 which provides Medicaid reimbursement to states for the 
purpose of funding community-based services for the developmental-
ly disabled that states would not otherwise receive through Medica-
id.141  The states then administer these waivers to individuals who 
 
munity, 16 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 193, 198 (1980-81). 
133 Hortas, supra note 11, at 161. 
134 Nancy K. Rhoden, The Limits on Liberty: Deinstitutionalization, Homelessness, and 
Libertarian Theory, 31 EMORY L. J. 375, 378-80 (1982). 
135 See Hortas, supra note 11, at 161. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Rhoden, supra note 134, at n.14. 
139 See id.; Rapson, supra note 132, at 203. 
140 Pub. L. No. 97-35 § 2176, 95 Stat. 813 (1981) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
1396n(c)(1) (2006)). 
141 Luana Olivas, Note, Helping Them Rest in Peace: Confronting the Hidden Crisis Fac-
ing Aging Parents of Disabled Children, 10 ELDER L.J. 393, 402 (2002).  In order for a state 
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have chosen community care over institutional living in order to pro-
vide them with individualized support services.142  With this federal 
incentive, many states began reorganizing their programs, further 
deinstitutionalizing many patients and providing them with a com-
munity-based alternative for their treatment.143  Particularly within 
the last twenty years, with the enactment of the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act and the decision of the landmark case, Olmstead v. 
L.C.,144 group homes have become an essential function of the 
healthcare system and the services provided for the developmentally 
disabled, and are now a necessary preference to institutional living.145 
 a.  The Americans with Disabilities Act and the 
  Community Integration Mandate 
In 1990, Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (“ADA”) after finding that, “historically, society has tended to 
isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some 
improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem . . . 
in such critical areas as . . . institutionalization . . . .”146  This congres-
sional finding marked the first time that Congress expressly referred 
to segregation via institutionalization as a form of discrimination.147  
“Institutionalization almost by definition entails segregation and iso-
lation.  Not only is segregation of the sexes prevalent, but segregation 
from families, normal society and peer groups is also a product of in-
stitutionalization.”148 
 
to receive these waivers, it must apply for a specific number of waiver slots and show that 
the cost of providing the community-based services is less than the cost of providing institu-
tionally-based services per capita.  Id. 
142 See Home and Community Based Services Waiver (OPWDD), N.Y. STATE DEP‟T OF 
HEALTH, http://www.health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/program/longterm/omrdd.htm (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2012) (explaining the HCBS in New York). 
143 Brief for Respondent at *4, Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (No. 98-536), 1999 
WL 144128, at *4. 
144 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
145 Id. at 607 (holding that states have an affirmative obligation to provide community-
based living options to those who would benefit from them as opposed to institutional liv-
ing). 
146 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2)-(3). 
147 Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 589 n.1. 
148 Brief for Respondent, supra note 143, at *9. 
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In drafting the ADA, Congress recognized that even with the 
notable progress made in the area of the rights of the mentally dis-
abled, the stigma that accompanies this handicap remains prevalent in 
today‟s society.149  The pervasiveness of this stigma has caused isola-
tion and substantial discrimination against those individuals with dis-
abilities, often resulting in “outright intentional exclusion, . . . over-
protective rules and policies . . . [and] segregation.”150  Similarly, 
Congress asserted that the proper goals in achieving a positive view 
of the disabled population should be “to assure equality of opportuni-
ty, full participation, independent living, and . . . [to impose a] na-
tional mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individu-
als with disabilities.”151  This has since become a pervasive theme in 
legislation throughout the country. 
In enacting the ADA, Congress instructed the Attorney Gen-
eral to implement anti-discrimination regulations in order to enforce 
the legislation.152  The Department of Justice then implemented the 
“integration regulation,” which requires public entities to “administer 
services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting ap-
propriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.”153  
However, an entity may escape making modifications to its programs 
“necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability” if it 
shows that “the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature 
of the service, program, or activity.”154  It is clear from this instruc-
tion that Congress had the intent to hold federal and state agencies 
accountable for providing these vitally important integration services. 
 
b.        Olmstead: Applying the Integration Regulation 
 
In June of 1999, the United States Supreme Court issued a 
 
149 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2)-(3), (5).  In its findings, Congress officially acknowledged 
this stigma by stating that, “census data, national polls, and other studies have documented 
that people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are se-
verely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally.”  Id. at § 
12101(a)(6). 
150 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5). 
151 Id. at § 12101(a)(8), (b)(1). 
152 Id. at §12134(a). 
153 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (emphasis added). 
154 Id. at § 35.130(b)(7). 
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landmark decision, in Olmstead v. L.C., involving two mentally dis-
abled women that were voluntarily admitted to a psychiatric hospit-
al.155  The plaintiffs sought removal from institutional living after an 
evaluation determining that each would benefit from a community-
based setting under the ADA.156  Despite having received this evalua-
tion, both reluctantly remained institutionalized and challenged their 
“continued confinement in a segregated environment,” maintaining 
that the State‟s refusal to allow them to move to an integrated com-
munity-based setting violated their rights under Title II of the 
ADA.157 
The Court held that a State‟s confinement of individuals with 
disabilities to institutions when a community-based setting would be 
more appropriate (what the Court refers to as “unjustified isolation”) 
constitutes discrimination based upon disability and, therefore, vi-
olates Title II of the ADA.158  Additionally, the Court held that states 
are required to make reasonable modifications to their services unless 
it would fundamentally alter the state‟s delivery and implementation 
of its services and programs,159 reinforcing the Department of Jus-
tice‟s enforcement of the ADA.  In evaluating whether a state may 
use this defense, a court may take into account “the resources availa-
ble to the State and the needs of others with mental disabilities.”160  
This holding thereby gave states an affirmative obligation to provide 
treatment in a community setting when such a setting is deemed more 
appropriate and within reason.161 
In its reasoning, the Court stated that this holding emphasizes 
two important principles: “First, institutional placement of persons 
who can handle and benefit from community settings perpetuates 
unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable or 
unworthy of participating in community life [and] . . . [s]econd, con-
finement in an institution severely diminishes the everyday life ac-
 
155 527 U.S. at 593. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 593-94. 
158 Id. at 597, 607. 
159 Id. at 603-04.  This defense cannot be established by mere cost, and must instead create 
an “undue hardship” upon the state in order for its compliance with the mandate.  Olmstead, 
527 U.S. at 606 n.16. 
160 Id. at 607. 
161 Id. 
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tivities of individuals, including family relations, social contacts, 
work options, economic independence, educational advancement, and 
cultural enrichment.”162  In keeping with the goals enumerated in the 
ADA, the Court continued to place a focus on promoting the inde-
pendence and social wellbeing of the mentally disabled. 
After Olmstead, a call for significant change extended to state 
legislatures in an attempt to comply with the Court‟s community in-
tegration mandate; however, the response was, and continues to be 
slow.163  With the increased demand for group homes and other resi-
dential facilities, already lengthy waiting lists for group homes con-
tinued to grow, causing a housing crisis that is still felt today.164  This 
is due, in large part, to a lack of guidance and clarity in which state 
changes will “cross the line from reasonable modification to funda-
mental alteration, when a waiting list is moving at a reasonable pace, 
or what constitutes an effectively working plan.”165  By using the 
fundamental alteration defense, states have been able to skirt some 
responsibility in making modifications.  Unfortunately, “[l]ower 
courts have generally decided that evidence of states‟ active com-
mitment, yet slow progress towards community integration, satisfies 
the ADA,” which in effect supports, rather than sanctions a state‟s re-
luctance to change.166 
 
162 Id. at 600-01. 
163 On the fifth anniversary of the Olmstead decision, the director of the Bazelon Center 
for Mental Health Law stated, “[m]ost states are enacting reforms at a snail‟s pace, defying 
the spirit of the ruling and preventing Americans with mental illnesses from participating in 
their communities . . . these [limited efforts] have produced little actual movement of people 
. . . into integrated community settings.”  Legal Advocate Cites Ongoing Segregation on Eve 
of Olmstead Anniversary, BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW (June 21, 2004), 
http://bazelon.org.gravitatehosting.com/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=bRBHCViwpf4%3d&tabi
d=328. 
164 See The Housing Crisis for New Yorkers with Disabilities, NEW YORK STATE 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (Nov. 17, 2011), 
http://www.health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/redesign/docs/miller_nyail_barriers_to_aai_
housing.pdf (finding that there is very limited housing available to people with disabilities, 
keeping them from living independently, and resulting in “22,248 New Yorkers living in 
nursing facilities who have indicated they wish to return to the community”). 
165 Samantha A. DiPolito, Deinstitutionalization and Community Integration: An Awaken-
ing of the Nation’s Conscience?, 58 MERCER L. REV. 1381, 1399 (2007). 
166 Id. 
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 2. How Group Homes Operate 
Most group homes are not operated by the State, but instead 
are typically developed, owned, and managed by authorized provid-
ers—usually private agencies that receive state funding.167  Regard-
less of their private status, group homes must function within the 
overarching guidelines enumerated by the state agency given the au-
thority to enact such guidelines by the state legislature.168 
 a. Funding 
States have traditionally received federal funding for the pur-
pose of operating institutions.169  However, in 1981, Congress 
enacted the Home and Community Based Services (“HCBS”) Waiver 
Program, which “allows [a] state to utilize a portion of its Medicaid 
funds, which would have been for institutional use, to provide com-
munity-based services instead.”170  To obtain a waiver, the State must 
show that the funds will go to community-based treatment for those 
who would otherwise need institutional care, and that the cost of 
those community services will not exceed the annual cost of the insti-
tution-based services.171  However, this waiver program is optional 
and it is within the State‟s discretion to determine the ways in which 
it will use its federal funding.172  Additionally, “when individuals 
with developmental disabilities move from an institution into the 
community, federal law allows them to take with them the dollars 
used for their care in the institution.  Thus, the „money follows the 
person‟ through the transition.”173  Moreover, under Olmstead, in or-
der for the State to use federal funding for community-based pro-
 
167 See generally N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 671.99(t) (2012) (defining an 
authorized provider as “[a]n incorporated or State government entity, holding a facility-
specific operating certificate from [OPWDD] . . . to deliver community residential habilita-
tion services . . . .”). 
168 See generally N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW 13.07(a), (c) (McKinney 2011) (giving 
OPWDD the authority to develop programs and provide housing for people with develop-
mental disabilities). 
169 Olivias, supra note 141, at 401. 
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grams—while remaining in accordance with ADA mandates requir-
ing that reasonable modifications be made—a State may “demon-
strate that it ha[s] a comprehensive, effectively working plan for plac-
ing qualified persons with mental disabilities in less restrictive 
settings, and a waiting list that move[s] at a reasonable pace not con-
trolled by the State‟s endeavors to keep its institutions fully popu-
lated.”174 
In New York, OPWDD has the responsibility of developing 
effective services for the developmentally disabled by adopting rules 
and regulations necessary to implement the delivery of these services 
to the mentally handicapped population.175  OPWDD relies upon oth-
er agencies from the public and private sectors, including non-profit 
and for-profit organizations, to carry out community-based programs 
and establish residential facilities for the developmentally disabled.176  
When a private agency opens a group home, the start-up funding and 
daily costs initially come from private entities, giving each group 
home the ability to create its own guidelines for the home‟s opera-
tion, so long as those guidelines satisfy the general requirements 
enumerated by OPWDD.177  In order to receive funding from 
OPWDD, the provider must be authorized and certified by OPWDD 
and have a qualified staff.178  In addition to the administrative re-
quirements, the group home must also sufficiently show that its ser-
vices promote each of the four goals listed in the statute: indepen-






174 Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 605-06. 
175 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW 13.07(a) (McKinney 2011) (conferring authority upon 
OPWDD to “assure development of comprehensive plans, programs, and services . . . [for] 
individuals with developmental disabilities”). 
176 See Frequently Asked Questions, NYS OFFICE FOR PEOPLE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL 
DISABILITIES, http://www.opwdd.ny.gov/hp_faqs.jsp (last modified June 17, 2011). 
177 See generally N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14 § 686.2(a) (2012) (stating that the 
guidelines enumerated by OPWDD “set forth the specific minimum requirements with 
which a facility . . . in the community residence . . . class, certified by [OPWDD], shall 
comply”). 
178 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14 § 671.4(a)(1)(i)-(ii) (2012). 
179 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14 § 671.6(a)(6)(ii)(a)-(d) (2012). 
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b.        OPWDD Regulations for Group Homes in New 
           York 
 
OPWDD “set[s] forth specific minimum requirements with 
which a facility . . . in the community residence . . . class, certified by 
[OPWDD], shall comply.”180  While there are several regulations 
with what seems like a lot of language, there are only a few basic re-
quirements.  An authorized provider (public, private, and state agen-
cies) must obtain, and continue to maintain, a certificate of operation 
from OPWDD, regardless of whether that entity is receiving, or plans 
to receive, funding from the State.181  In order to maintain its certifi-
cate of operation, an authorized provider will not be subject to regular 
inspection; however, OPWDD reserves the right to survey the facility 
at any time.182  Additionally, staff must be qualified and, in a super-
vised community residence, must be available at all times while resi-
dents are present.183 
Many of the OPWDD regulations provide general guidelines 
for the start-up and operation of a group home, as well as administra-
tive requirements and remedies.  By establishing only minimum re-
quirements, there is significant deference given to the private agen-
cies to develop their own regulations.  However, group home staff 
members and care providers are also tasked with affirming the rights 
of persons receiving services, such as being provided with a safe and 
sanitary environment, having an individualized plan of services,184 
and freedom from unnecessary restraint or medication.185  Also in-
cluded in these rights is the access to sexual instruction and family 
planning services, which necessarily encompasses the “freedom to 
express sexuality” and “make decisions regarding conception.”186  
Unfortunately, this right is statutorily limited by the competing right 
 
180 tit. 14 § 686.2(a) (emphasis added). 
181 Id. at (e). 
182 Id. at (e)(2). 
183 tit. 14 § 671.4(a)(1)(ii); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14 686.9(a)(4) (2012). 
184 Persons with disabilities living in residential facilities must have a written and indivi-
dualized treatment plan with the goal of “maximization of the person‟s abilities to cope with 
his or her environment, foster[] social competency . . . [and] enable[] him or her to live as 
independently as possible.”  tit. 14 § 633.4(a)(4)(viii). 
185 Id. at (a)(4)(i), (iv)-(v), (viii). 
186 Id. at (a)(4)(xi)(a)-(b). 
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of facilities enabling the entity to limit sexual expression in order to 
maintain proper management of the group home.187 
Even with this limitation on sexual expression, there are no 
statutory roadblocks that would prevent a married couple from living 
in a group home, nor are there any statutory references to the denial 
of a group home specifically for married couples.  The only opposi-
tion to the development of this type of group home would essentially 
have to be generated by the independent agencies using their profes-
sional judgment to deny its creation. 
 
c.        Policy of Individualized Treatment and Maximum  
           Independence 
 
One goal of community integration is to administer services 
in the least restrictive environment: an environment that “permits the 
greatest degree of independence consistent with one‟s decision-
making capacity.”188  The key in implementing this goal is to find a 
balance between independence and control.189  Many agencies choose 
to promote independence through “normalization,” a practice that 
“seeks to reduce the „differentness‟ associated with disability and to 
promote personal competence such that the disabled individual can 
live a life that more nearly approximates that of his or her nondi-
sabled counterpart.”190  With special attention given to the means and 
contexts of the services provided, the goal is to improve that person‟s 
quality of life, promote independence, and encourage personal auton-
omy by allowing the individual to exercise greater freedom of 
choice.191  With this type of person-centered planning, “there is a 
concerted effort to build the service around the person‟s wishes          
. . . .”192  In this context, “[s]upport means not only honoring choices 
but enabling them”193  A person-centered program will attempt to en-
courage normal life and tailor services around the individual‟s specif-
 
187 Id. at (a)(4)(xi)(c). 
188 BAROFF & OLLEY, supra note 3, at 246. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 252. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 254. 
193 BAROFF & OLLEY, supra note 3, at 254. 
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ic needs.194  Additionally, there is a focus on “shift[ing] the emphasis 
away from the person‟s disabilities and toward [his or her] capabili-
ties.”195 
In its regulations, OPWDD has a clear policy of focusing on 
services that will “promote and encourage . . . independence, integra-
tion, individualization, and productivity.”196  With an intent to create 
a family atmosphere that most resembles a home for its residents, the 
main goal in the group home setting is for each individual to feel 
comfortable in his or her new living situation in order to promote an 
atmosphere of growth and self-development.  One method of reach-
ing this goal is through the creation of a specific individualized ser-
vice plan for each resident.197  While such a plan may typically deal 
with medical care for the disabled individual, it will also necessarily 
include any other services and programs essential to his or her devel-
opment. 
With a policy of creating an individualized plan, it should log-
ically follow that living environments be modified to create an op-
timal living situation for each individual.  For a person seeking to 
marry and live with his or her spouse in a group home setting, a 
group home exclusively for married residents is likely an ideal living 
situation.  Not only will it furnish an appropriate setting in which to 
provide individualized services, such as sexual education and rela-
tionship training, but it will also promote the sense of autonomy that 
each group home strives to achieve for each of its residents.  By re-
quiring group homes to operate with these personalized policies in 
mind, the OPWDD regulations can even be seen to require that this 
type of group home be made available to this distinct group of people 
simply because they request it. 
 
194 Id. at 255. 
195 Id. 
196 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 671.5(a)(3) (2011).  The State wants residents 
to strive to become autonomous by asserting their values: “activities . . . which promote the 
person‟s ability to assess and utilize his or her strengths and capacity to make life status 
changes and to increase self-awareness about his or her values and preferences.  Id. at 
(a)(4)(vi). 
197 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14 § 633.4(a)(4)(viii). 
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IV. LIKELY ARGUMENTS AGAINST A GROUP HOME 
FOR MARRIED COUPLES 
A. The Fundamental Alteration Defense 
When evaluating whether to develop a new group home, such 
as the one proposed in this Comment, the State or the private agen-
cy198 will attempt to argue that the requested accommodations will 
amount to a fundamental modification in the State‟s services and 
programs.199  Initially, the State and/or agency will do a cost-benefit 
analysis,200 and likely conclude that the costs of hiring new em-
ployees, training, and potentially constructing a new building for the 
home will outweigh the benefits for the individuals seeking this liv-
ing accommodation.201 
The State‟s responsibility to accommodate individuals with 
appropriate community-based care is not without limits.202  To avoid 
implementing a modification, the State may show that the modifica-
tion is unreasonable because it would create a “fundamental altera-
tion” to the State‟s services and programs.203  In Olmstead, the Court 
acknowledged that a fundamental alteration under the ADA should 
be interpreted pursuant to previous readings of section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act of 1976,204 which includes the defense of undue 
hardship.205  Under this section, evaluation of an undue hardship re-
quires more than a mere assessment of the program‟s projected cost 
in relation to the state‟s total budget.206  It also requires a: 
 
198 For the purpose of this Comment, it should be assumed that a private agency will be 
subjected to the same regulations as the State because it carries out a public function that is 
historically an exclusive function of the government, as required for state action under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See generally Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 
436 U.S. 149, 158 (1978). 
199 See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 603. 
200 See id. at 597 (requiring that the State “not only [review] the cost of providing com-
munity-based care to the litigants, but also the range of services the State provides others 
with mental disabilities, and the State‟s obligation to mete out those services equitably”). 
201 See Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7. 
202 Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 603. 
203 Id. 
204 29 U.S.C § 794 (1994). 
205 Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 606 n.16. 
206 Id. 
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case-by-case analysis weighing factors that include: 
(1) [t]he overall size of the recipient‟s program with 
respect to number of employees, number and type of 
facilities, and size of budget; (2) [t]he type of the reci-
pient‟s operation, including the composition and struc-
ture of the recipient‟s workforce; and (3) [t]he nature 
and cost of the accommodation needed.207 
Additionally, the State has the burden of showing that the requested 
accommodation “would be inequitable in light of available resources 
and the State‟s responsibility to care for a large and diverse popula-
tion of other persons with disabilities as well as the State‟s responsi-
bility to provide services in an equitable manner.”208  Furthermore, 
cases relied upon by Congress in enacting the ADA hold that cost de-
fenses may only outweigh ADA duties when the cost is substantially 
higher than the projected benefits.209 
Here, it is unlikely that the projected costs of providing a 
small number of these group homes would outweigh the potential 
benefits to the residents.  While hiring and training will certainly be 
required, it is doubtful that there will be a high demand for several of 
these group homes within the state due to the rarity of married 
couples with mental disabilities.  This requires only a limited number 
of homes to be developed.  Furthermore, the individuals that would 
be living in the group home would all be entitled to community-based 
care and would inevitably require out-of-home placement, therefore 
already necessitating the hiring of new employees and additional 
training.  The most significant cost would be the actual construction 
of the group home or renovation of a current structure in order to ac-
commodate the unique living arrangements required by a married 
couple.  However, it is difficult to see how this cost will outweigh the 
benefits of autonomy, independence, and individualized services that 
each resident will receive.  Even if the cost is determined to outweigh 
the benefits, it is unlikely that it will meet the lofty threshold as to 
substantially outweigh the benefits. 
 
207 Id. 
208 DiPolito, supra note 165, at 1396. 
209 Weber, supra note 122, at 288. 
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B. Liability for Improper Sexual Behavior 
The State or agency operating a group home has the often-
conflicting responsibilities of protecting those within its care from 
harm, while also promoting the sexual expression of its residents.210  
As a result, the State and/or agency may attempt to rely on its ability 
to limit a resident‟s sexual expression when it conflicts with the 
proper management of the home.211  This reaction would likely be 
based upon some fear of the potential for sexual aggression and sex-
ually deviant behavior.212  However, such a fear is unfounded and 
based upon an assumption that a person capable of consenting to sex-
ual activity will become a sexual deviant, putting other residents of 
the group home in danger.213 
This belief is reminiscent of the Eugenics Era, when the pub-
lic viewed “the mentally retarded as criminally oriented and sexually 
promiscuous.”214  This is precisely the viewpoint that Congress and 
state legislatures have been trying to wipe clean from society‟s pa-
lette.  Additionally, “there is no indication of an increased frequency 
of sexual offenses in retarded youth relative to their non-handicapped 
counterparts.”215  In fact, several studies have found that married 
mentally disabled individuals are generally happier and have fewer 
social and personal problems, such as breaking the law and issues 
with substance abuse.216  Furthermore, it is even less likely that a 
married person in a group home will develop sexual aggression due 
to the fact that he or she has already demonstrated an understanding 
 
210 Lynden, supra note 68, at 17. 
211 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, 633.4 (a)(4)(xi)(c). 
212 See Elizabeth J. Reed, Note, Criminal Law and the Capacity of Mentally Retarded 
Persons to Consent to Sexual Activity, 83 VA. L. REV. 799, 806 (“Retarded individuals are 
believed to be at greater risk of being sexually abused, especially in institutional settings, 
making it difficult [for the State] to grant them too much sexual autonomy for fear of 
abuse.”). 
213 See Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 59 (discussing the potential for sexual 
misconduct in a group home setting, but stating that this is not plausible here because of the 
nature of the marital relationship). 
214 Reed, supra note 212, at 803. 
215 BAROFF & OLLEY, supra note 3, at 292.  In 1996, Baroff and Olley conducted a study 
of North Carolina adult prison inmates.  Id.  Only two percent of the mentally disabled adults 
that were imprisoned were charged with sexual offenses, which is approximately the same 
percentage as the nondisabled population.  Id. 
216 See Munro, supra note 9. 
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of sexual activity and of the sanctity of marriage, having been 
deemed capable to give consent. 
The argument that individuals able to consent to sexual rela-
tionships will cause a danger within the group home is surprising, to 
say the least, because of the contradiction it presents.  Many group 
homes have both male and female residents.217  Is there not the same 
danger in those group homes as there would be for having married 
couples living in a group home together?  In fact, it can be argued 
that the danger is even greater in a home with unmarried individuals, 
because they likely have not been determined to have capacity to en-
gage in sexual relationships, and are therefore less likely to have had 
any formal sexual education training.  Even with this clear danger, 
the State and private agencies still made the decision to open the 
group home to opposite sex residents.  What exactly is stopping them 
with a group home for married couples? 
V. CONCLUSION 
Treatment of the developmentally disabled has improved sig-
nificantly throughout American history.  With a new outlook geared 
towards promoting independence and cultivating individual needs, 
Congress and state legislatures have taken pro-active steps to im-
prove the quality of life for the disabled population.  While marriage 
statutes may still reek of eugenics ideals, mentally disabled couples 
have become more prevalent and marriage has become a more ac-
cepted notion.218 
With the ultimate goals of normalization, improving quality 
of life, and empowering autonomy while providing a family-like set-
ting, a group home exclusively for married couples with developmen-
tal disabilities seems like the natural next-step in the progression of 
rights and services provided for this population.  The benefit of the 
creation of such a group home will far outweigh any financial burden 
it may impose on the state or private agency.  Additionally, with New 
York‟s focus on personalizing services and developing individualized 
plans, it makes logical sense to provide what seems like the most per-
sonal accommodation available.  These OPWDD regulations can 
 
217 Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7. 
218 See Munro, supra note 9. 
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even be read as to require that this accommodation be provided for 
this small group of people, simply because they are requesting it. 
Unfortunately, the general public may not receive the proposi-
tion made in this Comment well, because of its somewhat taboo na-
ture.  However, there are no group homes of this kind in the country, 
and any state or agency that may decide to develop such a group 
home will be on the forefront of the expansion of civil rights for the 
developmentally disabled, potentially creating a national trend.  
Hopefully, the future will bring even more empowering change for 
this group of people in need of a particular service, so that they too 
can have the “normal” lives we all take for granted. 
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